The Impact of the Precision and Scale of News on Trading Volume: Evidence from Volume Following Profit Warnings by Bulkley, George
 1
 
 
 
Paper Number:  06/01 
 
The Impact of the Precision and Scale of News on Trading 
Volume: Evidence from Volume Following Profit Warnings 
 
Abstract 
We contribute new empirical evidence on the determinants of trading volume for stocks. 
First, we investigate whether the precision of the information in a public announcement 
affects volume. We compare volume following profit warnings that offer a new 
quantitative earnings forecast with volume following those that simply announce that 
earnings will fall short of expectations. Second, for the sample of warnings that include a 
quantitative forecast, we examine the impact on volume of the size of the earnings 
surprise. We find that volume is higher following warnings that include a new earnings 
forecast, and higher the larger is the surprise.  
                                                                                                     January 2006 
 
George Bulkley 
Ioannis Krassas 
 
 
Xfi Centre for Finance 
University of Exeter 
Exeter 
Devon 
EX4 4RJ 
UK 
                              
Contact Author: I.G.Bulkley@exeter.ac.uk 
Xfi, Streatham Court, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4ST, UK 
Tel: 44-1392-263214 
Fax: 44-1392-262525                             
 2
 
 
The Impact of the Precision and Scale of News on Trading 
Volume: Evidence from Volume Following Profit Warnings 
 
 
 
           1. Introduction 
 
To many observers the level of trade on stock markets appears excessive, see for example 
the discussion in Dow and Gorton (1997). For example turnover data on the NYSE 
implies that the average share is held for well under two years
1
.  Given the costs of trade 
to investors this seems to be a surprisingly short holding period and a natural question to 
ask is whether this scale of trading is rational. In order to address this issue we need to 
understand exactly why investors trade. In particular can trade be explained by rational 
disagreement between investors about fundamental value or are instead investors subject 
to behavioural biases, for example overconfidence, which cause them to trade too 
intensively for their own good, Odean (1998, 1999)
2
?  
 
The assumption that agents simply receive different private signals might seem a natural 
way to rationally explain trade but when this idea is subjected to formal scrutiny it proves 
that different private signals alone cannot explain trade if the private signals are drawn 
from a fixed distribution that is common knowledge, Aumann (1976). Evidence of a 
substantial increase in trading volume associated with public announcements also casts 
doubt on this simple explanation, for example Ryan and Taffler (2004). A public 
announcement should level the information playing field and so on this account it should 
if anything reduce, and certainly not increase, trading volume. 
 
Considerable effort has gone into developing different models that are consistent with the 
evidence that public announcements generate trade. Disagreement inevitably plays a 
                                                
1
 See the NYSE website. 
2
 Another question, examined by Dow and Gorton (1997), is the incentives for agents to trade under 
optimal contracts with delegated portfolio management.  
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central role but it is motivated in a more sophisticated way than simply assuming 
different private signals are drawn from a common distribution. Trading volume can 
increase following public news for two distinct reasons in this theoretical literature. In 
one class of model the public news is assumed to itself introduce a new source of 
disagreement, Karpoff (1986), Kandel and Pearson (1995). For example some investors 
may view the announced failure of a take-over bid as good news and others view it as bad 
news because each group has a different model of what drives earnings growth. Another 
reason for disagreement may be that investors have different information processing 
abilities, Kim and Verrecchia (1997). A rather different reason for trade following public 
news is that investors have different degrees of confidence in earlier private signals. 
When a public signal arrives after private signals there is a common interpretation of the 
news, but Bayesian updating results in differences in the extent to which beliefs change, 
because of the differences in the precision of priors, and this generates trade, Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991). 
  
Different ways of testing these models have been explored. Both classes of model predict 
that on days when there is public news there should be positive relationship between the 
size of the surprise and trading volume. If the size of the surprise is measured by 
abnormal returns on the day of the announcement then this prediction can be tested using 
data on volume and returns. It is confirmed by overwhelming evidence of a positive 
relation between the absolute size of returns and volume on days of public 
announcements, for surveys see for example Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Karpoff 
(1987). A more discriminating test is offered by evidence that even announcements that 
bring virtually no net news, measured by abnormal returns on the day of the news, 
nevertheless generate substantially higher volume than days with no public news, see for 
example Bamber and Cheon (1995), Kandel and Pearson (1995). This observation is 
consistent with models that assume that the public news brings a new source of 
disagreement, for example Kandel and Pearson (1995), but not with models that assume 
volume is driven by Bayesian updating in the context of heterogeneous precisions of 
prior beliefs.  
 
Another approach to testing models of trade is to look at the relation between volume at 
earnings announcements and the dispersion in beliefs. The model developed by Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) implies that increased dispersion of prior beliefs results in increased 
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volume at the date of the public signal. Several studies have tested this proposition, using 
the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as the dispersion measure. Atiase and Bamber (1994) 
and Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997) find that trading around scheduled earnings 
announcements is increasing in measures of prior disagreement. Another test is to 
examine how the dispersion of beliefs changes after the public signal, Kandel and 
Pearson (1995). If announcements themselves introduce a new source of disagreement 
then we should expect to see the relative rankings of different investors’ expectations 
change after the public signal, but the relative ranking should not change under the 
common interpretation assumption. Kandel and Pearson (1995) find evidence for these 
reversals, sometimes called “belief jumbling”, and infer this to be support for the 
differential interpretation model. 
 
In this paper we contribute new empirical evidence that may be used to assess models of 
volume. Using data on volume following profit warnings, we firstly investigate whether 
the precision of the news affects trading volume. The impact of precision on volume is a 
topic that has not been previously explored in the empirical literature, although an effect 
is predicted explicitly in Kim and Verrecchia (1991), proposition 3, and is implicit in 
models that assume public news is itself a source of disagreement. More precise news 
should be associated with less volume in the latter class of models since the more precise 
the news the less is the opportunity for disagreement. Profit warnings allows us to 
examine the effect of precision because profit warnings fall into two classes, those that 
provide new quantitative guidance and those that simply state that earnings will be below 
the current market expectations. We will refer to these two classes as quantitative 
warnings and qualitative warnings and judge the impact of precision by comparing 
volume following these two types of warning.  
 
A potential problem in a simple comparison of volume following these two classes of 
warning is that qualitative warnings might on average be perceived as better (or worse) 
news than the average quantitative warning and if perceived scale of the news is 
correlated with volume then the impact of precision alone cannot be inferred from a 
simple comparison. Kasznik and Lev (1995) argue that managers facing a significant 
negative EPS surprise issue a “hard” announcement including a new earnings forecast. 
Comparatively softer surprises are dealt with by issuing either a qualitative warning or no 
warning at all. On the other hand Bulkley and Herrerias (2005) find that abnormal returns 
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when qualitative warnings are announced are significantly more negative than for the 
average quantitative warning, implying that qualitative warnings are initially perceived as 
worse news. In order to control for the perceived size of the surprise we compare volume 
following the two classes of warning using only that subset of quantitative warnings that 
have the same average abnormal returns in the announcement window as the average 
qualitative warning. We explain our method in detail in section 3.  
 
The second type of evidence we report is on the relation between volume and the scale of 
the news. The models reviewed above imply a positive relationship between the size of 
the surprise and volume but evidence for this prediction usually comes from a correlation 
between volume and abnormal returns, which may be assumed to be a proxy for the size 
of the surprise. A problem with measuring the size of the surprise by abnormal returns is 
that volume and abnormal returns are determined simultaneously and therefore we cannot 
rely on inference in a regression test estimated by OLS where we control for other 
potential determinants of volume. We cannot easily control for the endogeneity of 
abnormal returns using two-stage least squares in this context because there will be no 
instrument for abnormal returns in an efficient market. Profit warnings offer a chance to 
test a hypothesis about volume using an objective measure of size of the news, rather than 
its perceived size measured by abnormal returns, because the scale of the news may be 
measured in our sample by the difference between the previous market forecast and the 
new forecast issued by the firm in the warning. An advantage of measuring size directly 
is that problems of simultaneity are avoided so that inference using OLS to estimate a 
model of volume is possible.  
 
In section 3 we set out an empirical model of trading volume on days of news 
announcements that controls for the variables that other authors have found to be 
important determinants of trading volume around information events. We include a 
dummy variable to reflect the type of warning and infer the effect of precision on volume 
from the estimate and significance of the coefficient on this dummy variable. We 
describe the data in section 2, results are reported in section 4 and section 5 concludes.  
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2. Profit warnings 
 
The data set used in this study consists of public announcements by US firms that are 
issued when firms expect an earnings per share, EPS, outcome that will be below the 
current market consensus. There is often discretion, and hence debate, over whether a 
particular statement should actually be described as a “profit warning”. Our data consists 
of statements that were listed as  “profit warnings” on the CNN site, 
www.cnn/markets/IRC/warnings.htlm. The profit warnings studied here span from late 
February 1998 up to October 31st 2000 and in this period  2446 warnings were recorded.  
                                
The warnings dataset includes the date of the warning, the firm issuing the warning, the 
earnings’ announcement that is the subject of the warning, the previous EPS forecast, and 
the new forecast, as seen in the following example of how the information is recorded on 
the CNN site: 
 
 
Date  Company Name Ticker Period Pre-estimate Warning 
April 14, 1998 MEMC Elec WFR Q1 ($0.55) Loss $0.72 
April 14, 1998 SMC Corporation SMCC Q1 $0.23 Below estimate 
April 15, 1998 Alliance Gaming ALLY Q3 $0.30 $0.05-0.06 
 
It is worth noting that, the previous EPS forecast is always an accurate point estimate, for 
example “$0.5 per share”. The warnings issued were far from being uniform. More 
specifically, the warnings take the following forms:  
 
• Point estimates :  e.g. “Earnings will be $0.5 per share” 
• Open ranges : e.g. “Earnings will be less than/ no more than $0.5 per share” 
• Closed ranges : e.g. “Earnings will be $0.3-$0.7 per share” 
• Qualitative : e.g. “Earnings will be less than expected” 
 
The first 3 categories are quantitative warnings, since they always contain a new 
numerical estimate of EPS. The last is classified as qualitative. These give a qualitative 
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description of the new EPS estimate, and may include quantitative facts for the firms’ 
operation, but not directly linked to an EPS estimate. For example a warning that 
quantifies losses on a particular contract or in a particular market or operational division, 
but does not offer a new EPS forecast, will be described as qualitative. We recorded 747 
qualitative warnings and 1699 quantitative warnings in the sample period.  
 
We report in Table 1 the distribution of profit warning announcements throughout the 
timeline of the sample used here. Note that there is a significant increase in the number of 
profit warnings in September/October 2000, due to revised disclosure regulation, 
regulated Federal Disclosure, which was announced in August 2000 in the U.S. 
  
 
[Table 1.] 
 
 
 
Trading volume and returns data for the warning companies were collected from CRSP 
and market wide data were collected from DATASTREAM for NYSE/AMEX trading 
volume for the period between February 1998 and October 2000.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses and methodology 
 
In this section we set out the specification of the tests and describe how the variables used 
are constructed. We are interested in testing two hypotheses and we describe the 
methodology for each in the following two sub-sections. 
 
3.1 HI: Trading volume on the day of public news is lower when the news is less precise. 
 
This is an explicit prediction, proposition 3, of Kim and Verrecchia (1991). Models 
where volume is driven by disagreement over the interpretation of the news do not yield 
formal predictions for the effect of precision on volume. However it seems very much in 
the spirit of this idea that more volume should be observed when news is less precise 
since the less precise the news the greater the scope for disagreement. We test H1 by 
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examining whether trading volume is significantly different following quantitative and 
qualitative warnings.   
 
There are different approaches that might be applied to testing hypotheses about the 
determinants of abnormal volume. One approach involves first constructing a benchmark 
for normal volume and then testing hypotheses using abnormal volume measured as the 
difference between actual volume and expected volume measured as this benchmark, for 
example Ryan and Taffler (2004). Tkac (1999) surveys the issues involved in 
constructing such a benchmark. For example Tkac discusses the relative importance that 
past firm volume and market volume should have in a benchmark. However rather than 
applying a two-step procedure where a model of expected volume is estimated at the first 
stage, we adopt a regression framework where variables that would otherwise be included 
in the benchmark enter explicitly as regressors.  
 
We test H1 using a cross-section regression of abnormal trading volume, ABV, measured 
as the ratio of event volume to average daily volume over the last six months, on a 
dummy variable that reflects the type of warning and three other control variables: lagged 
abnormal volume, market abnormal volume, and firm size. We estimate the regression by 
Ordinary Least Squares since the right hand side variables can all be assumed to be 
exogenous, and profit warnings from different firms are rarely issued on the same day so 
that there is no reason to be concerned about cross-sectionally correlated errors that often 
beset empirical work in finance.    
 
We estimate the regression: 
 
, 1 1 1 2 3 , , 1 4 1t t t NYSE t tABV a ABV a SIZE a ABV a D+ − += + + +           (1) 
 
The variables are defined in detail below and the dummy variable takes the value 1 for a 
qualitative warning and zero otherwise. In evaluating the effect of precision on trading 
volume it is important for unbiased inference that the dummy variable is not correlated 
with the perceived size of the surprise since the perceived size of surprise is likely to be 
correlated with the dependent variable, as we discussed in the introduction.  
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We ensure that the average perceived surprise is the same, whether the dummy variable 
takes the value of unity or zero, by the following procedure. We include in the regression 
test all firms where a qualitative warning was issued but only include the sub-sample of 
quantitative warnings that by selection have the same average abnormal returns in the 
announcement window as the average abnormal return for qualitative warnings. We 
implement this idea by first recording the abnormal return on each warning in the 2-day 
announcement window. The average abnormal return on the sample of qualitative 
warnings is -25.1% and the average abnormal return on quantitative warning is only –
20.9%.  We therefore eliminate quantitative warnings from our sample for this test, 
starting with that which has the least negative abnormal returns and continuing to 
eliminate successively more negative warnings until the average abnormal returns on the 
quantitative sample remaining falls to –24.9%
3
. We now have a sample of quantitative 
warnings that on average are perceived as equally bad news as the sample of qualitative 
warnings, so that statistical inference on the impact of precision can be based on an OLS 
estimate of the slope coefficient on the dummy variable in equation (1)
4
.  
 
The other variables in regression (1) are defined and constructed as follows: 
 
Abnormal trading volume for the warning firm, , 1t tABV +  
Event abnormal volume is measured as average abnormal volume over the day of the 
profit warning announcement (t) and the day following the announcement (t+1) relative 
to average daily volume over the last six months. We use a two-day window because 
some companies issue profit warnings after the closure of the market. One could measure 
volume as the percentage of outstanding shares that are traded on the event day, 
following for example Collett (2004). The advantage of our measure, pointed out by 
Bamber and Cheon (1995) who use a similar ratio to measure abnormal trading volume, 
is that this method controls for cross-sectional differences in turnover between stocks. 
                                                
3
 An alternative procedure would be to eliminate quantitative warning on the criterion of the size of the 
earnings surprise, starting with the smallest surprise, and continue eliminating warnings that are 
successively larger surprises until again the average abnormal return for the remaining quantitative 
warnings was the same as the average abnormal returns on the qualitative warnings. An advantage of 
this procedure is that the criterion for exclusion is an exogenous characteristic, but the disadvantage is 
that this method results in a smaller remaining sample of quantitative warnings. 
4
  Another way to control for the size of the surprise that might be considered is to include the size of 
the surprise as a regressor in equation (1). However the only way to measure the size would be by 
abnormal returns and including abnormal returns as a regressor in equation (1) would violate the 
assumptions required for OLS since volume and abnormal returns are determined simultaneously and 
two-stage least squares suffers from the problems described in the introduction. 
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For example bid-ask spreads and the percentage of shares owned by directors and by 
institutions might all affect turnover both at announcements and on non-event days, 
Utama and Cready (1997). 
 
Size of the firm that issues the warning  
We measure size as the average market capitalisation of the warning company in the 
warning month. Several studies have found size to be a significant determinant of 
turnover on the average trading day, although different results have been obtained. For 
example Llorente et al. (2002) find that turnover is greater for larger firms but Tkac 
(1999) finds empirical evidence for a negative relationship between firm size and 
volume. However since we are scaling event turnover by average recent turnover this 
direct source of size effects will cancel out in our specification. However there are other 
reasons why a profit warning from a small firm may elicit a more pronounced reaction. 
For example it is hypothesised and verified by Jackson and Madura (2003) that smaller 
firms have fewer information leaks before announcements. Also there will be more 
publicly available information for larger firms produced by external parties. For example 
size is correlated with the number of analysts following a stock. As Baginski and Hassel 
(1997) point out, if these external parties produce enough information to meet the 
demand, then a profit warning and the external information collection could act as 
substitutes to each other. This would imply a higher volume following a warning from a 
small firm. If there are behavioural determinants of abnormal volume one might also 
expect abnormal volume to be decreasing in size since when abnormal returns are found 
for news events, and explained by behavioural biases, it is often found that these are more 
significant for smaller firms.  
 
Firm’s abnormal trading volume for the previous day of the warning  
It is typically found that volume is serially correlated, for example Llorente et al. (2002), 
and therefore this is included as a control variable in our model of event volume. 
 
Abnormal trading volume of the market for the day of the announcement 
Abnormal market volume is used as a proxy for a macro-effect that can be present in the 
reaction to a firm’s profit warning, see for example Tkac (1999) who shows the 
importance of controlling for aggregate market volume. Since we have scaled firm event 
volume by average daily volume over the last six months we need to measure market 
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volume in a consistent way. It is measured as the average market volume on the NYSE 
over the two-day window, relative to average volume over the last six months. That is 
abnormal volume, 
, , 1
, , 1
,62
NYSE t NYSE t
NYSE t t
NYSE
V V
ABV
V
+
+
+
=  
 
3.2 H2: If a new earnings forecast is issued trading volume is higher the larger is the size 
of the surprise. 
 
This hypothesis is tested by OLS estimation of the following regression applied to the full 
sample of firms that issued a quantitative warning. 
 
, 1 1 1 2 1 3 , , 1 4 5 1 6
( )
(1 )t t NYSE t t t
month
O N
ABV a D a D a ABV a SIZE a ABV a
P
+ + −
−
= − + + + + +     (2) 
 
 
Estimating regression (2) requires discussion of the construction of one new variable, the 
size of the earnings surprise. 
 
The size of the earnings surprise.  
We measure the new earnings estimate, N, for quantitative forecasts as either the point 
estimate, mid-point if closed range is specified, or end point of open ended range. Let O 
be the pre-announcement consensus EPS estimate of the market, reported on the same 
CNN site. The EPS surprise, O-N, will always be positive since by construction we have 
a sample where the new forecast is bad news. The absolute surprise needs to be scaled 
since absolute changes in EPS will depend in an arbitrary way on the absolute size of the 
EPS. We need a measure of the relative size of the surprise. One might scale the change 
in forecast by the old forecast, following for example Damodaran (1989), but when the 
old forecast was zero the observations have to be dropped. Even if one accepts loosing 
some observations, another problem with this method is that when the old forecast is very 
close to zero the regressor takes on extreme values. We therefore scale the change in the 
EPS by the stock price in order to obtain a measure of the relative size of the earnings 
surprise. The average stock price for the month of the announcement was used as the 
weighting factor because of the volatility of daily prices around profit warnings. The 
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news variable is then multiplied by 1(1 )D− , where 1D  represents the qualitative 
warnings’ variable, taking the value 1 when there is a qualitative warning and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
HI: Trading volume on the day of a public announcement is higher when the news is 
more precise. 
 
The results from estimating regression (1) that tests this hypothesis are reported in Table 
2.  
 
 
                                                             [Table 2 here] 
 
  
As we explained above, the results reported in Table 2 are for the sub-sample of 
quantitative warnings that have the same average announcement abnormal returns as the 
average of the abnormal returns following qualitative warnings. We see clear evidence in 
Table 2 that the volume of trade when investors receive a profit warning that includes a 
new quantitative EPS forecast is significantly greater than when they receive only 
qualitative guidance. Therefore, the H1 hypothesis is accepted: quantitative profit 
warnings result is significantly greater volume of trade, holding constant the average 
perceived size of the surprise in each class.   
 
The signs on the control variables are all as expected. The lagged abnormal volume and 
abnormal volume on the market are both significant and positively correlated with 
abnormal volume on the announcement day. The coefficient on size is of the sign that is 
expected if surprises are on average relatively bigger for smaller firms, although it is not 
significant. We experimented with log-linear and semi-log specifications but in no case 
did firm size become significant. 
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H2: If a new earnings forecast is issued trading volume is higher the larger is the size of 
the surprise. 
 
In table 3 we report the results from estimation of regression (2) whose specification was 
motivated in sub-section 3.2. 
 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
Consistent with predictions of models of rational trade, the larger is the surprise the 
greater is the trading volume. This is not surprising given existing evidence of a positive 
correlation between abnormal returns and volume, but it is re-assuring to see these results 
confirmed when the surprise is measured explicitly and in a multivariate model where we 
have controlled for the other determinants of trading volume. 
  
We report in table 4 results to confirm the robustness of our results to our specification. It 
can be seen that the significance of our results is not sensitive to the particular 
specification and we also report, without including the tables here, that working with a 
log-linear model also made no substantial difference to the significance of these results. 
 
 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
 
 5. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have shown that when news is more precise it generates more trade, 
consistent with the predictions of Kim and Verrecchia (1991). On the other hand these 
results are not easily reconciled with models that explain greater trade on days of public 
news as a result of the differential interpretation of the news. Although formal results for 
the impact of the precision of the news on volume are not reported for these models it is 
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in the spirit of differential interpretation that less precise signals should engender more 
trade. If the increased trade is a result of disagreement over the meaning of the news then 
the more precise the news the less the scope for disagreement, and the lower should be 
the volume.  
 
Although the results we report on precision are consistent with one model of rational 
trade they are also consistent with some behavioural models of trade. Whether or not 
agents are overconfident, Odean (1998, 1999), the extent to which they revise their 
beliefs in response to new information may also depend on the nature of that information. 
Agents subject to the “anchoring and conservatism bias”, Kahneman & Tversky (1974), 
may respond differently to quantitative warnings than to qualitative warnings. According 
to this bias agents appear to “anchor” on their initial forecasts/valuations, and they make 
insufficient adjustments when they receive new contrasting information, particularly if it 
is not quantitative. A quantitative profit warning presents them with a new numerical 
anchoring point, making the comparison to prior forecasts more clear, whereas a 
qualitative warning has a less obvious anchoring point. The expected outcome is that 
agents will act more confidently, so that more trading is expected, when presented with a 
strong new anchoring point. The results reported here complement experimental results 
for asset markets that show that agents are more confident in their decision-making 
processes for buying/selling stocks upon receiving new information when this 
information is precise (quantitative), Hirst, Koonce and Miller (1999).  
 
Our second result is that larger surprises are associated with more volume and this is 
consistent with the models of rational trade. There is already empirical support for this 
prediction inferred from evidence of a positive relationship between abnormal returns and 
volume. However it is encouraging that the prediction is confirmed when the size of the 
surprise is measured objectively, rather than proxied by abnormal returns, and when we 
control for other determinants of trading volume. 
 
The comment by some observers that trading volume seems to be unduly high can 
ultimately only be evaluated using a calibrated model of rational trade but the first step in 
this challenging task is to determining whether existing models of rational trade are 
consistent with the data. In this paper we have tested the predictions that models of 
rational trade make for trading volume following public announcements. We find that the 
 15
response of volume to the scale and precision of profit warnings is consistent with 
different models of rational trade that have been proposed.  
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
, 1 1 1 2 3 , , 1 4 1 5t t t NYSE t tABV a ABV a SIZE a ABV a D a+ − += + + + +  
Coefficient Lagged Abnormal 
volume, 1a  
Firm Size, 2a  
Market Abnormal 
Volume, 3a  
Qualitative 
Dummy, 4a  
Intercept, 5a  
Estimate 1,16 -1E-07 204,44 -17,47 24,36 
t-stat 8,03 -1,23 2,19 -3,16 2,49 
R-square                   0,068 
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Table 3. 
 
, 1 1 1 2 1 3 , , 1 4 5 1 6
( )
(1 )t t NYSE t t t
month
O N
ABV a D a D a ABV a SIZE a ABV a
P
+ + −
−
= − + + + + +  
Coefficient Quantitative, 1a Qualitative, 2a  
Market 
Abnormal 
Volume, 3a  
Firm Size, 4a  
Lagged 
Abnormal 
Volume, 5a
Intercept,  
6a  
Estimate 222.83 -14.40 200.12 -8.55E-088 1.15 21,42 
t-stat 2.40 -2.54 2.15 -1.01 8.00 2,18 
R Square                0.070 
 
                                                                           Table 4. 
 
, 1 1 1 2 1 3
( )
(1 )t t
month
O N
ABV a D a D a
P
+
−
= − + + (4) 
Coefficient Quantitative, 1a  Qualitative, 2a      Intercept, 3a    
Estimate 228.48 -24.38 48,17     
t-stat 2.44 -7.98 23,33     
   
, 1 1 1 2 1 3 , , 1 4
( )
(1 )t t NYSE t t
month
O N
ABV a D a D a ABV a
P
+ +
−
= − + + +  (5) 
Coefficient 
Quantitative, 1a  Qualitative, 2a  
Market Abnormal 
Volume, 3a  
Intercept,  4a   
Estimate 224.00 -14.343 195.00 28,11  
t-stat 2.40 -2.50 2.07 2,83  
    , 1 1 1 2 1 3 , , 1 4 5
( )
(1 )t t NYSE t t
month
O N
ABV a D a D a ABV a SIZE a
P
+ +
−
= − + + + +  (6) 
Coefficient 
Quantitative, 1a  Qualitative, 2a  
Market Abnormal 
Volume, 3a  
Firm Size, 4a  Intercept, 5a  
Estimate 215.69 -14.28 197.05 -8.41E-08 28,23 
t-stat 2.30 -2.49 2.09 -0.98 2,85 
 
 
